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Utah Career Service Review Office 
and Utah Department of 
Corrections, 
Respondents. 
Appeal No: 20150170 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction to review the final agency action of the 
Career Service Review Office pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(A). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
CSRO's decision was reasonable and rational 
Burgess's employment was terminated for off-duty misconduct that, 
when coupled with his failure to adequately take responsibility for and 
understand the seriousness of his misconduct, caused the agency director to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lose confidence in Burgess's ability to safely supervise inmate construction 
crews working outside the prison. The CSRO found that substantial evidence 
supported the agency's decision and concluded that the agency had not 
abused its discretion, particularly in light of how the agency director was 
actively implementing a charge from the governor to restore the public's trust 
in the agency. Is the CSRO's decision within the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality? 
Standard of review: 
This Court reviews "an agency's application of its own rules for 
reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not total 
deference." Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 886 P.2d 70, 72 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (citing Kent v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 
1993). 
Burgess stipulates that this standard of review governs "all issues 
raised in this appeal." Aplt. Brf. at 5. 
Preservation: 
In both its initial decision and its subsequent decision denying 
reconsideration, the CSRO found that substantial evidence supported the 
2 
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Agency's determination that discipline was warranted and concluded that the 
Agency had acted within the bounds of its discretion in the discipline it 
imposed. R. 418-47, 490-495. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21(3): 
(3) Evidentiary/Step 4 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 4 hearing shall be a 
hearing on the record according to Subsections 67-19a-406(1) and (2), held de 
nova, with both parties being granted full administrative process as follows: 
(a) The CSRO hearing officer shall first make factual findings 
based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing without 
deference to any prior factual findings of the agency. The CSRO 
hearing officer shall then determine whether: 
(i) the factual findings made from the evidentiary/step 4 
hearing support with substantial evidence the allegations made 
by the agency or the appointing authority, and 
(ii) the agency has correctly applied relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes. 
(b) When the CSRO hearing officer determines in accordance 
with the procedures set forth above that the evidentiary/step 4 factual 
findings support the allegations of the agency or the appointing 
authority, then the CSRO hearing officer must determine whether the 
agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is 
excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. In making this latter determination, the CSRO hearing 
officer shall give deference to the decision of the agency or the 
appointing authority. If the CSRO hearing officer determines that the 
agency's penalty is excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an abuse 
of discretion, the CSRO hearing officer shall determine the appropriate 
remedy. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: 
Stephen Burgess appeals the decision of the Career Service Review 
Board (CSRO) affirming the termination of his employment with the Utah 
Department of Corrections. The CSRO determined that substantial evidence 
supported the allegations of misconduct and that the Department did not 
abuse its discretion in imposing termination. The issue before this Court is 
whether the CSRO acted reasonably and rationally in affirming the 
termination of Burgess's employment. 
Burgess was fired for off-duty misconduct. Airport police were 
concerned that Burgess and his two traveling companions were too drunk to 
drive, so they intervened and helped Burgess and his traveling companions 
get into taxi cab instead of driving home. But moments after the police left, 
Burgess and the others got out of the cab and into a vehicle belonging to one 
of the traveling companions. Airport police quickly intercepted the men 
again before they left the parking lot. The friend who was driving had a 
blood alcohol level of .097 and he was arrested for DUI. Burgess was 
arrested for public intoxication, based on the officers' assessment that 
4 
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Burgess was a danger to himself for leaving a vehicle with a sober driver and 
~ getting into a vehicle with a driver who had been drinking. 
This incident - coupled with Burgess's failure to adequately justify or 
take responsibility for his decision to get out of the cab - caused the head of 
Corrections, Director Rollin Cook, to question Burgess's judgment and lose 
confidence in Burgess's ability to adequately perform his job, particularly in 
light of Director Cook's efforts to increase departmental accountability for 
misconduct. This increase in accountability was part of a plan Director Cook 
¾:I was implementing to meet the governor's charge to improve the culture of the 
department and restore the public's trust in the department. Critical to the 
director's decision was that Burgess did not seem to recognize the seriousness 
of his misconduct and defended his misconduct solely on blind trust in a 
friend, at the expense of disregarding the police intervention. 
Course of proceedings: 
Burgess appealed his termination to the CSRO. A two-day trial was 
held. R. 594-95. The CSRO affirmed Burgess's decision. R. 418-47. Burgess 
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSRO denied. R. 490-95. This 
appeal followed. 
5 
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Disposition below: 
On January 13, 2015, the CSRO affirmed the Department's decision to 
terminate Burgess's empioyment. R. 418-47. The CSRO found that 
substantial evidence did not support the charge of public intoxication but 
affirmed all other aspects of the termination. R. 432. It also concluded that 
termination was not an abuse of the Department's discretion. R. 445-4 7. On 
February 12, 2015, the CSRO denied Burgess' amended motion for 
reconsideration, elaborating on and supplementing the findings and 
conclusions of its January 13 decision. R. 490-495 (attached in the 
addendum). Among other things, the CSRO found that Burgess's misconduct 
"violated policy" (R. 492); it also clarified that only the public intoxication 
basis was set aside, and nothing more, and gave some non-exhaustive 
examples of how Burgess's misconduct violated other policies cited in the 
Notice of Intent. R. 493-94. 
6 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
~ Governor's mandate to fix problems in the agency 
Director Rollin Cook is the executive director of the Utah Department 
of Corrections. Tr. 318. 1 Prior to this, Director Cook had worked for nearly 
twenty-three years in the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, the last four or 
five years of which he had management and leadership responsibilities 
similar to his current responsibilities. Tr. 318-19. 
Governor Herbert appointed Director Cook as the head of corrections in 
¼J 2013. Tr. 318. In two interviews before the appointment, Governor Herbert 
outlined what he expected of Cook if he were selected for the job: to change 
the "significant cultural problems within the organization," thereby 
improving the morale and culture of the department and restoring the 
public's trust in the department. Tr. 319-20. These long-time problems had 
culminated when the "previous department administration had been removed 
by a vote of no confidence from the employer organizations and the 
employees" in the department. Tr. 320. The department likewise "didn't 
...;;) 1 The covers of the two volumes of the trial transcript are respectively marked as 
pages 594 and 595 of the record. Citations to the transcript will be to the 
transcript's native pagination. Volume 1 consists of pages Tr. 1-271. Volume 2 
consists of pages Tr. 272-600. 
7 
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have a great reputation" among sister law enforcement and corrections 
agencies. Tr. 320. 
Expectations of a higher standard of conduct 
From day one as head of the agency, Director Cook observed that a lack 
of accountability for employee misconduct had contributed significantly to the 
agency's problems under past administrations. Tr. 322. He learned that, 
under past administrations, misconduct had generally been met with 
relatively light discipline and "the disciplinary history of the organization has 
not been very good." Tr. 322, 360. Director Cook prepared a plan for 
improving the agency's problems that included, among other things, 
increasing accountability for misconduct by holding employees to a higher 
standard of conduct than they had in the past. Tr. 322-31. He shared his 
plan and expectations throughout the organization, including holding 
multiple meetings with employees that included question-and-answer 
portions and in-depth Powerpoint presentations. Tr. 331. He made it "clear 
to the employees" that he was "going to hold them to a higher standard than 
- -- -
they'd been held to in the past." Id. This and other improvements were 
stressed continuously in staff meetings and in weekly messages Director 
Cook sent out to all employees. Tr. 332. Despite the enormity of the needed 
8 
I~ 
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changes, Director Cook described his efforts as "persistent" and "determined." 
r.j Tr. 334. Director Cook described the core function of the department as going 
beyond keeping the community safe and providing a safe and secure 
environment for inmates, but also to be a "good partner in the community." 
Id. 
Burgess 
Burgess began working for the Department in 2008. Tr. 508. At the 
~ time of termination, his job was to supervise inmate construction crews 
working outside the prison. Tr. 508-09. 
Airport police intervene 
The off-duty misconduct giving rise to Burgess's termination occurred 
on December 14, 2013, at the Salt Lake International Airport. Burgess had 
just arrived from an out-of-state trip, when an airport police officer noticed 
that Burgess and two traveling companions appeared intoxicated to one 
degree or another. Tr. 31-32, 34. The officer "frequently" dealt with 
intoxicated people at the airport, knew the telltale signs of intoxication, and 
had been trained in conducting field sobriety tests. Tr. 32-33, 39. None of 
the three looked sober enough to drive. Tr. 35. Both of the traveling 
9 
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companions, Clint Fredrickson and Chris Surnrners - not Summers alone -
were "being loud and boisterous" in the airport terminal. Tr. 32. And "both 
appeared to be stumbling or hanging on to each other." Tr. 32. Burgess 
''wasn't stumbling nearly as bad" as the other two, but "looked a little 
intoxicated" with a "glassed over" look. Tr. 34. The men smelled of alcohol. 
Id. 
Since 11:00 am that morning, Burgess had consumed six alcoholic 
drinks - two hard liquor drinks and the "equivalent of about two quarts of 
beer." Tr. 557. Burgess had observed Fredrickson consuming alcohol 
through the day, having seen him drink at least two margaritas and sixteen 
ounces of beer. Tr. 520. 
The three men boarded a shuttle bus to the economy parking lot. Tr. 
34. The officer became concerned about possible drunk driving "because 
there's really no reason to go to the economy lot unless you have a car there 
and I didn't see them with anyone else who appeared to be sober to drive 
them." 'l'r. 34-35. He radioed a fellow officer who was out on vehicle patrol 
that the "[t]hree individuals look like they might be intoxicated" and w~_re 
headed to the economy parking lot. Tr. 35. He asked the patrol officer to 
"check and make sure they don't drive." Tr. 35. 
10 
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Officer Nathan Stowell received the call, and heard the first officer 
~ report that there were "three possibly intoxicated males." Tr. 45. He also 
had been trained in how to detect intoxication. Tr. 58-59. He and other 
officers intercept the men as they got off the shuttle bus. Tr. 45, 484. Both 
Fredrickson and Burgess testified that this encounter with the police was 
intimidating. Fredrickson said "we were absolutely surrounded by airport 
police ... from every direction" and "they were just up in our faces, it was 
pretty intimidating. I was embarrassed, I was mad, I was scared of being in 
<I' trouble." Tr. 484. Burgess testified that he was shocked, surprised, and 
intimidated by the police's sudden appearance. Tr. 527. 
Police talked with the men for a few minutes. Summers lied to police 
that someone was coming to pick them up. Tr. 47, 528. Burgess initially 
tried to correct Summer's lies, but after thirty seconds to a minute he "took a 
few steps away" and talked individually with one of the officers. Tr. 528. 
Burgess told that officer that the men did not, in fact, have someone to drive 
-4iJ them home. Tr. 47. Fredrickson - "saying whatever I needed to get out of 
that situation" - insisted that they had a ride home. Tr. 485-86. Fredrickson 
said in the "group conversation" that "[i]t's probably not a good idea for us to 
be driving"; although Burgess was never more than a few steps away, he 
11 
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testified that he never heard Fredrickson say this. Tr. 486, 499 (emphasis 
added). 
After talking with the three men, Officer StoweH believed that 
Summers should not be driving. Tr. 47. As to Burgess and Fredrickson, they 
both had "had red eyes, glossy eyes." Tr. 46. They each smelled individually 
of alcohol. Tr. 66, 73. Officer Stowell would not have let either of them drive 
without investigating further to "determine a level of intoxication beyond 
odor of alcohol." Tr. 46-4 7, 62. He did not investigate further, because 
neither insisted on driving. Tr. 72. At trial, Officer Stowell testified that he 
would not have felt comfortable with a person driving ..who had consumed the 
amount of alcohol in the time period Burgess had; he considered that to be a 
"significant amount of alcohol consumption during that day." Tr. 74. 
The Taxi Cab 
The officers called a cab; when it arrived, they suggested the men - all 
three of them - ride home in the cab. Tr. 47, 528. Whether by acquiescence 
or express agreement, all three men agreed to take the cab home. Tr. 47 ("I 
suggested a cab and they agreed on that.") (emphasis added). Fredrickson 
expressly agreed. Tr. 47. Burgess did not object. Tr. 529. The officers did 
not order any of the men to get into the cab. Tr. 486, 529. All three 
12 
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voluntarily got into the cab. Tr. 486. With the men safely in the cab, the 
vi officers cleared the call and left, thinking the matter had been resolved. Tr. 
48. 
But moments after police left, the men got out of the cab and into 
Fredrickson's truck. Tr. 486-87. Fredrickson testified that he had never 
intended on taking the cab home, but had intentionally misled police into 
thinking he did, so they would leave him alone. Tr. 498-99. Fredrickson was 
planning on going hunting the next morning and did not relish the thought of 
a two-hour round-trip drive to retrieve his truck. Tr. 487-88, 506. But he 
also testified that if Burgess had simply encouraged him to stay in the cab, he 
would have. Tr. 505. Burgess admitted that he knew of Fredrickson's 
hunting trip and desire to drive home to avoid the inconvenience of coming 
back to pick up the truck. Tr. 555. 
At trial, when Burgess was asked if it ever crossed his mind, while in 
the cab, "that it might not be a good idea to get out of the cab." He replied, 
4 "That's not an easy yes or no answer." Tr. 553. Burgess said he chose to get 
out of the cab based solely on Fredrickson's statement that he was sober 
enough to drive, even though Burgess understood that "there was some risk" 
in getting out of the cab. Tr. 554-55. When asked why he did not mention 
this risk to the others, or encourage them to stay in the cab, he replied: 
13 
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"That's where, again, looking in hindsight, there's just not a good answer for 
that." Tr. 555. All of these answers were consistent with several earlier 
statements he had made that he "didn't have a good explanation in 
hindsight" for getting out of the cab and into Fredrickson's truck. Tr. 558. 
The arrest 
The officers were quickly notified that the cab had reached the parking 
lot exit without any passengers. Tr. 49, 79. The officers stopped the truck 
before it left the parking lot and began a DUI investigation. Tr. 50, 79-80. 
Officer Stowell was frustrated that the men had left the cab. Tr. 57-58. He 
thought that a reasonable "[n]o harm, no foul" solution had been reached that 
would have ensured the men got home safely with a sober driver. Id. 
Burgess was arrested for public intoxication, after officers concluded 
that Burgess was a "danger to himself' by "removing himself from a vehicle 
that was driven by a sober driver (taxi cab) and boarding a vehicle driven by 
a possible intoxicated driver.n Tr. 53-54. This conclusion was not generalized 
to all three suspects, but was made "particularly with regard to Mr. Burgess 
[because] he had gotten out of the taxi cab and gotten into a vehicle that was 
driven by someone who had been drinking and was possibly intoxicated." Id. 
(emphasis added). No field sobriety tests were conducted on Burgess because 
14 
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he had not insisted on driving and had "agreed to go with the cab." Tr. 72. 
" As Officer Stowell handcuffed Burgess, he noticed an odor of alcohol. Tr. 50. 
He again noticed Burgess's red eyes, as another sign of possible intoxication. 
Tr. 51. 
Fredrickson's blood alcohol level was ultimately measured at .097, more 
than twenty percent higher than the legal limit. Tr. 93-94. He was arrested 
~ 
for DUI. Tr. 95. One officer noticed, that in addition to the odor of alcohol 
and red, glossy eyes, Fredrickson's speech was slurred. Tr. 91. The officer 
~ testified that, even without knowing Fredrickson's blood alcohol level, he 
would not have ridden in a vehicle driven by Fredrickson - "the alcohol smell, 
the eyes, and his slurred speech alone would motivate me not to get into the 
vehicle with him." Tr. 95. 
Department investigation 
Two days after the arrest, on December 16, 2015, Burgess self-reported 
the public intoxication arrest to his immediate supervisor. R. 587. However, 
he made no mention of getting out of the cab in defiance of police 
intervention, or that the driver of the truck he got into was charged with 
DUI. R. 587; Tr. 129, 538. Instead, his report inaccurately suggested that 
his arrest had come during the initial encounter after disembarking from the 
15 
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shuttle bus: "They got on the shuttle to go to their vehicles and at some point 
were stopped by the cops, taken off the shuttle and arrested." R. 587. 
An internal investigation was opened. Burgess told the internal 
investigator that he simply trusted Frerickson's assertion that he was sober 
enough to drive; however, Burgess did "not have a good answer for why he got 
out of a taxi, with a sober driver, [and] into a truck with a driver who had 
been drinking." Tr. 138, R. 548, 552-53. The investigator ultimately 
determined that Burgess had violated two Department policies - AE 02/07 
and AE 02/11. These policies provide, in part: 
Utah Department of Corrections Policy AE 02/07 
It is the policy of the Department that members conduct 
themselves lawfully and honestly, both on and off duty. 
Because members of the Department are part of the state's 
criminal justice system and are accountable by the citizens for 
their conduct, their actions and conduct are legitimately held to a 
higher standard. 
Dishonest and/or unlawful behavior of members has the potential 
to undermine public confidence and trust in the Department and 
its ability to carry out its mission. 
Members shall not engage in any act, conduct or omission that 
violates federal, state, local law or administrative rule, nor shall 
they aid, abet, or encourage others to do so. 
Utah Department of Corrections Policy AE 02/11 
No member shall act or behave privately or officially in such a 
manner that undermines the efficiency of the Department, ca uses 
16 
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the public to lose confidence in the Department, or brings 
discredit upon himself/herself, the State of Utah, or the 
Department. 
R. 544-49. The investigator based his conclusions on the following: 
--Burgess acknowledged he had been drinking alcohol earlier in 
the day. 
--Burgess admitted exiting the taxi and leaving the parking lot as 
a passenger in Fredrickson's vehicle. Burgess said he does not 
have a good answer for why he decided to get out of the taxi and 
enter into Fredrickson's truck. 
--The Airport Police report states Burgess was arrested for 
intoxication as he created a risk to himself by exiting a car with a 
sober driver (taxi cab) to get into a car with a possibly intoxicated 
driver (Fredrickson's truck). 
--The police report states Burgess smelled of alcohol and had red 
and glossy eyes 
--Burgess has been charged with Intoxication, a Class C 
Misdemeanor in Salt Lake City Justice Court (case #141400305). 
His arraignment has been set for February 11, 2014. 
R. 549. 
Director Cook's decision to terminate 
On February 7, 2014, Burgess received a notice of "Intent to Discipline 
lllJ) - Dismissal" from his division director, recommending that Director Cook 
terminate Burgess's employment. R. 550-51. This notice identified Burgess's 
misconduct at the airport as the basis of the recommendation, including 
Burgess's leaving the cab and getting into Fredrickson's truck despite the 
intervention of airport police. Id. It also cited the same policy provisions set 
17 
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forth above, as well as Utah Admin. R. 477-9, which states, in part: 
"Employees shall comply with the standards of conduct established in these 
rules and the policies and rules estabiished by agency management." 
On February 14, 2014, Burgess wrote an email to Director Cook, asking 
for lesser discipline. R. 552-53. He stated: "I know my actions that night 
ultimately were the wrong ones. I made a very big mistake by getting out of 
the cab with the other two passengers." R. 552. He further stated: "I was a 
follower rather than a leader." Id. Regarding getting out of the cab, he said: 
"Clint [Fredrickson] was in a situation that he needed his vehicle, he felt he 
was ok to drive, and I, very wrongly, went along with it. I had reached the 
point that I just wanted to get home." Id. Burgess also noted that he "could 
not argue with what the police said they saw or smelled, bottom line is that I 
had been drinking." Id. 
On February 26, 2015, Burgess met with Director Cook. R. 554-55. 
Burgess admitted that "he exercised poor judgment." Tr. 353. When asked 
why he got out of the cab, he started telling about how he thought 
Fredrickson was not drunk. Director Cook asked Burgess to leave 
Fredrickson out of his excuses, to which Burgess said, "I don't have a good 
answer, then." Tr. 546, 552-53. Although Burgess now suggests that 
Director Cook's interjection derailed his answer; he admitted at trial that he 
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said the same thing in the internal investigation when no one was telling him 
to leave Fredrickson out of his excuses. Tr. 552-53. 
Director Cook described his decision on how much discipline to impose 
as a "difficult decision to make" and "very draining" personally. Tr. 352, 354, 
355. A decision that adversely affects someone's life is difficult to make, he 
testified, "but you have to make it based on what's good for the organization, 
what's good for the people of the State of Utah." Tr. 354. Director Cook had 
been making termination decisions like this one for approximately ten years. 
Tr. 360 
Based on his meeting with Burgess, his review of Burgess's file, and his 
review of Burgess's February 14 letter, Director Cook perceived that Burgess 
had not taken responsibility for his misconduct and was "always blaming it 
away or acting as if it's not a serious offense" and "not necessarily 
understanding the significance of what occurred." Tr. 344, 352. Director 
Cook believed that this was a "serious enough offense to be considered for 
termination." Tr. 344. He further believed that imposing anything less than 
termination would be a step backward into the very culture he had been 
charged by the governor to eliminate. Tr. 344. 
"More than one thing" led Director Cook to consider termination. On 
basis was the public intoxication. Tr. 345. A separate basis was Burgess's 
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decision to get out of the cab and get into a car with Fredrickson behind the 
wheel, despite having "caught a break" by being allowed to ride home safely 
in the cab. Tr. 345. Director Cook testified: 
This decision wasn't just based on his public intox[ication] 
charge, it was based on his poor judgment. So it was a 
combination of the public intoxication, sure, that booking, but it 
was also about the decision, one to get out of a taxi cab when 
you're going home, if you're cold and you're tired and so on. And 
then choosing not only to get out of the cab, but then get into a 
vehicle with someone who's intoxicated. (Tr. 361.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
As a law enforcement and corrections officer, that is just 
unacceptable. How can the public trust us to deal with situations 
like that when the people that have these types of problems -
when we do them? We can't. (Tr. 346.) 
The decision of being intoxicated in public, the decision to get out 
of a cab, the decision to drive with someone who's intoxicated, the 
poor judgment shown throughout the entire process, the lack of 
ownership, the lack of seeing that it's serious, all of those things, 
including things of what's happened in previous disciplines, other 
things I've been responsible for in deciding discipline. All of 
those different things are important when I make the decision. 
(Tr. 369-70.) (Emphasis added.) 
Director Cook did not find any of Burgess's explanations to be mitigating 
circumstances. Tr. 350. 
After meeting with B1.irgess, Director Cook no longer trusted ·Burgess to 
adequately perform his job. Tr. 347, 355. Director Cook was concerned that 
Burgess would again demonstrate poor judgment in the future, and the risk 
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that this might happen while on duty: 'Tm worried his judgment is going to 
~ be impaired when he's managing felons in the community." Tr. 355. Director 
Cook testified that a sworn public safety officer is expected to have "a whole 
different level of trust there that goes towards the whole community" and 
that public has a much higher expectation of what to expect from a 
corrections officer who is managing inmates out in the community. Tr. Tr. 
356, 359. 
At the time Director Cook made his decision, the public intoxication 
charge and the POST investigation were both still pending. The criminal 
case was later dismissed without prejudice, but not until after Director Cook 
had made his decision. Tr. 534, 557, 589. POST later declined to impose 
sanctions. R. 590. All Director Cook knew at the time he made his decision 
was that both matters were still pending. 
At trial, Burgess agreed that his conduct warranted discipline and 
disagreed only with the severity of the discipline: 
Q. So you now recognize that trusting Clint that night was a 
mistake? 
A. I think I've always recognized that. 
Q. Okay. Do you believe that for what happened you deserve to 
be disciplined? 
A. I've said that a few times, yes. 
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Q. You just don't disagree with the discipline itself? 
A.No. 
Tr. 562. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The CSRO reasonably and rationally upheld the Department's decision 
to terminate Burgess's employment. 
The actual events that occurred at the airport are largely undisputed. 
Airport police were concerned enough about possible drunk driving that they 
intervened, which intervention culminated with all three men getting into a 
cab. Moments later, in complete disregard or outright defiance of this 
significant police intervention, Burgess got out of the cab. He then got into 
Fredrickson's truck. He did not encourage Fredrickson to stay in the cab or 
to not drive. This misconduct, when coupled with his failure to adequately 
take responsibility for and understand the seriousness of his misconduct, 
caused Director Cook to lose confidence in Burgess's ability to safely 
supervise inmate construction crews working outside the prison. 
The CSRO reasonably found that substantial evidence supported the 
agency's decision and reasonably concluded that the agency had not abused 
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its discretion, particularly in light of how the agency director was actively 
implementing a charge from the governor to restore the public's trust in the 
agency. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of review 
The CSRO's decision should be affirmed because it is reasonable and 
rational. This Court reviews "an agency's application of its own rules for 
reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not total 
deference." Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 886 P.2d 70, 72 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (citing Kent v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 
1993)). Burgess stipulates that this standard of review governs "all issues 
raised in this appeal." Aplt Brf. 5. 
This deferential standard of review is applied where the CSRO 
determines a mixed question of law and fact that "is the type of decision 'in 
which the [CSRO's] special expertise puts it in a better position than an 
appellate court to evaluate the circumstances of the case in light of the 
[CSRO's] mission."' Sorge v. Office of Atty. Gen., 2006 UT App 2, ,r 2, 128 
P.3d 566 (quoting Utah Dep't of Corr. v. Despain, 824 P .2d 439, 443 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991)). This "is the type of decision that involves discretion" and is 
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reviewed "to ensure it falls within the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ,r 30, 308 P.3d 461. 
The CSRO "abuses its discretion only when it reaches an outcome 'that is 
clearly against the logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of 
the application, or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be 
drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing."' Sorge v. Office of Atty. 
Gen., 2006 UT App 2, ,r 22, 128 P.3d 566 (quoting Tolman v. Salt Lake Cty. 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
This standard is not a correctness standard: "Reasonableness ... is 
essentially a test for logic and completeness rather than the correctness of the 
decision." Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ,r 32, 308 P.3d 461 
(emphasis added). "[A] discretionary decision involves a question with a 
range of 'acceptable' answers, some better than others, and the agency or 
trial court is free to choose from among this range without regard to what an 
appellate court thinks is the 'best' answer." Id. at ,r 30; see also Tolman, 818 
P.2d 23, 26 (quoting R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 759 (1976)) ("Discretion 
__ '~!1--~~-111.pa~ses the power of cl:ioice among several courses of actic~m, _~~ch~ of 
which is considered permissible."'). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403( 4) governs judicial review of final agency 
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allows an appellate court to "grant relief only if ... it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced" by certain 
agency actions. Id. Although Burgess does not cite to a specific subsection, 
his arguments appear to invoke subsections 403(4)(g) & 403(4)(h)(i): 
(4) The appellate court.shall grant relief only if, on the basis of 
the agency's record, it determines that the person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not support~d by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by 
statute. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(g) and (h)(i). 
The CSRO's limited review 
The CSRO's "authority to review departmental disciplinary actions is 
limited to determining if there is factual support of the charges and, if so, 
vs> whether the sanction is so disproportionate to the charges that it 'amounts to 
an abuse of discretion."' Lunnen v. Utah Dep't. of Transp., 886 P.2d 70, 72 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Utah Dep't of Corr. v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439, 
443 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)) (emphasis added). These limits are set forth in 
Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21. 
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Burgess challenges the CSRO's application of this rule to the facts 
before it. Aplt. Brf. 5. Under the rule, the CSRO "shall first make factual 
findings based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing without 
deference to any prior factual findings of the agency." Utah Admin. R. 137-1-
21(3)(a). The CSRO then determines whether these findings "support with 
substantial evidence the allegations made by the agency" and whether the 
"agency has correctly applied relevant policies, rules, and statutes." Utah 
Admin. R. 137-1-21(3)(a)(i) & (ii). 
Upon finding factual support for the agency's allegations, the CSRO 
must then "determine whether the agency's decision, including any 
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise 
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21(3)(b). In 
making this determination, the CSRO "shall give deference to the decision of 
the agency." Id. 
Substantial evidence supports the CSR01s factual findings 
The CSRO's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and 
-- •-- - -- - • --•--- --•-- ------
should be affirmed. "An administrative law decision meets the substantial 
evidence test when a reasonable mind might accept as adequate the evidence 
supporting the decision." Oliver v. Labor Comm'n, 2015 UT App 225, ,r 8, 794 
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Utah Adv. Rep. 62, --- P.3d. --- (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is 
"more than a scintilla of evidence, though less than the weight of the 
evidence." Commercial Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 888 P.2d 707, 711 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Although much of Burgess's arguments focus on what his subjective 
intentions were in getting out of the cab, he has not shown that the CSRO's 
findings, when considered with the totality of the evidence, are outside the 
range of reasonable and rational inferences that CSRO could have reasonably 
drawn from the evidence presented at trial. The test is whether "a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate the evidence supporting the 
decision," not whether some of the evidence would have supported a different 
result. Oliver v. Labor Comm'n, 2015 UT App 225, if 8. 
His factual challenge states a preference for evidence to which he 
wishes the CSRO had given more weight without showing that the CSRO 
unreasonably gave more weight to conflicting evidence. At best, he presents 
some inferences that the CSRO arguably could have made within the range of 
reasonableness, if it had, in its discretion, given more weight to some 
evidence and less weight to other evidence. But this Court cannot improperly 
substitute its judgment between conflicting inferences that the CRSO might 
have been drawn from the evidence. It is the provision of the CSRO, "not 
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appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent 
inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the [CSRO] to draw 
the inferences." EAGALA v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 43, ii 16, 
157 P.3d 334. This is true, even if all of the inferences Burgess seeks were 
equally reasonable to those actually drawn by the CSRO - which they are 
not. This Court simply does not "substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though [it] may have come to a different 
conclusion had the case come before [it] for de novo review." Id. 
The CSRO's findings are logically and rationally based on the evidence 
presented at trial, much of which was unrefuted. Airport police intervened 
and Burgess was made unequivocally and painfully a ware of their concerns. 
Burgess knew that the police proposed that all three - not just Summers -
take the cab home. Burgess voiced no opposition to this plan. Burgess 
voluntarily got into the taxi cab. Just moments after the police left, Burgess 
voluntarily and willfully got out of the cab. He then voluntarily and willfully 
got into Fredrickson;s truck. He chose to do so, even despite the 
"intimidating" police intervention that had just occurred. He also admitted 
that, although he was aware of the risks of getting out of the cab, he did not 
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Department's Notice of Intent and in Director Cook's decision. And the 
CSRO made explicit findings that these events happened. 
Burgess also failed to refute Director Cook's testimony of why 
termination was necessary to the best interests of the Department. This is 
detailed extensively in the statement of facts, above, but included, in part: 
his charge from the governor; his persistent efforts to reform the 
Department's culture and restore the public trust; his opinion that a lesser 
punishment that did not reflect the seriousness of the misconduct would 
undermine these reforms; his making it clear Department employees would 
be held to higher standard than in the past; and his perception that Burgess 
was not taking full responsibility for his actions and failed to understand the 
seriousness of his misconduct. Burgess conceded at trial that his job required 
extra vigilance because he supervised inmates working outside the prison, 
out in the community, where they posed a greater danger to the public. 
Director Cook testified that he could no longer trust Burgess to do his job 
adequately. 
The CSRO also reasonably and rationally concluded that Burgess's 
misconduct violated standards of conduct and Department policy. Burgess's 
arguments on this point overlook his admission at trial that he did in fact 
deserve to be disciplined for his conduct, a concession he admitted making 
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more than once. R. 562. In admitting that discipline was warranted, 
Burgess noted his disagreement only with the Director Cook's choice of which 
discipline to impose. Id. Under Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21, CSRO's factual 
determination ends once it determines that discipline is warranted, so any 
dispute therewith should end with Burgess's definitive concession. See Utah 
Admin. R. 137-1-21(3) (once the CSRO finds factual support for the alleged 
violations, its inquiry turns to proportionality); see also Despain, 824 P.2d at 
445 (same). 
Additionally, Burgess's argument fails because it overlooks the express 
findings in CSRO's order denying reconsideration. Burgess argues that "[t]he 
CSRO decision also contains no finding or suggestion that Burgess's conduct 
was dishonest" and that "the only finding in the CSRO decision (or allegation 
of the Department) of wrongdoing was that Burgess exhibited poor 
judgment." Aplt Brf. 25. This completely overlooks the supplemental fact 
findings in CSRO's order denying reconsideration, which is the CSRO's final 
agency action in this case. 2 See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-302(i)(a); Pentskiff 
Interpreting Serus. V Dep't of Health, 2013 UT App 157, ,ri110, 12, 305 P.3d 
2 Because this order, R. 490-95, is not attached to the opening brief, it is attached as 
an addendum to this brief, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(ll)(C). 
30 
I.. 
l. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
218 (upon the filing of a request for reconsideration, the agency's original 
,& order "no longer constitutes final agency action"). Among other things, that 





cab and into Fredrickson's truck did in fact "violate policy." R. 492, 490-95. 
The CSRO clarified that only the public intoxication findings were 
vacated and that all other factual allegations in the Notice of Intent were 
affirmed, which included allegations that Burgess violated standards of 
conduct and policy. R. 493. By way of example, in a non-exhaustive list, the 
CSRO expressly noted "other policies" that Burgess violated. First, the 
CSRO found that Burgess violated UDC Policy AE 02/07 because he "he was 
clearly dishonest," he "was not honest in his actions when he indicated he 
would take a taxi, got in the taxi, but then got out of the taxi," and he 
"deceived the airport police officers by allowing them to believe he would do 
something and then not doing it." R. 493. And, second, the CSRO found that 
Burgess violated UDC Policy AE 02/11.03 because "this incident had the 
potential to bring discredit upon the Department in the public arena, and 
moreover, it did bring discredit upon Grievant within the Department." R. 
494. 
In addition to policy violations, Burgess also violated standards of 
conduct. Burgess glosses over this point, arguably waiving the issue. Aplt. 
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Br. 17. The Department argued at trial that Utah Admin. R. 477-9, which 
was cited in the Notice of Intent, requires, in addition to compliance with the 
policies themselves, that employees also comply with the "standards of 
conduct" established in the administrative rules and departmental policies. 
Tr. 593-94. Violation of these "standards of conduct" was expressly listed in 
the Notice of Intent as a basis for discipline, independent of department 
policy violations. R. 551. As an example of how the Utah Administrative 
Rules provide that employee discipline is not limited to policy violations only, 
but may include other things, the Department noted that the rules provide 
for discipline in cases of "misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance," or for 
"failure to advance the good of the public service, including conduct on or off 
duty which demeans or harms the effectiveness or ability of the agency to 
fulfill its mission." Tr. 594-95 (quoting language from Utah Admin. R. 477-
11). 
And Burgess's "poor judgment" argument also fails. Aplt. Brf. 16-17. 
He was not disciplined for some abstract exercise of poor judgment. Rather, 
he was disciplined for his actions - actions that demonstrated poor judgment. 
--- - •- - +. ----- ··•--- •-- - + 
That he exercised poor judgment - specifically in getting out of the cab and 
into Fredrickson's truck - is simply an inference that can be drawn from his 
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defied it, logically and reasonably support the inference, even if other 
evidence, such as Burgess's self-serving testimony, might (reasonably or 
otherwise) have support a different inference. Moreover, the CSRO and 
Director Cook were not the only ones to draw that inference. Burgess himself 
admitted to Director Cook that he "exercised poor judgment." Tr. 353. 
Whether deemed to be poor judgment or something else, there was never any 
question that Fredrickson's actions at the airport were the basis of his 
discipline. Those actions were clearly alleged in the Notice of Intent and 
expressly sustained by the CSRO as a violation of policy, as set forth above. 
Considering the entire record, Burgess has not shown that the CSRO's 
factual findings are "clearly" against the logic and effect" of the evidence, or 
"clearly" against the "reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn" from 
the evidence. Sorge, 2006 UT App 2, il 22. He has not shown that the 
CSRO's findings were without a logical or rational basis in record. See 
Murray, 2013 UT 38, ,I 32 ("[r]easonableness ... is essentially a test for logic 
and completeness rather than the correctness of the decision). To the 
contrary, substantial evidence supports the findings. Accordingly, this Court 
.; should affirm . 
.J 
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Proportionality 
The CSRO was reasonable and rational in concluding that Director 
Cook's decision to terminate was not an abuse of discretion. As set forth 
above, Burgess stipulates that all issues in this appeal should be reviewed for 
reasonableness and rationality. This is not a correctness standard: 
Reasonableness is a "test for logic and completeness rather than the 
correctness of the decision." Murray, 2013 UT 38, ,I 32 (emphasis added). 
This Court will reverse only if the CSRO reaches an outcome 'that is clearly 
against the logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of the 
application, or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn 
from the facts disclosed upon the hearing."' Sorge, 2006 UT App 2, ii 22 
(quoting Tolman, 818 P.2d at 26). 
The CSRO, in turn, makes a limited inquiry to determine whether the 
discipline imposed "is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an 
abuse of discretion." Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21(3)(b). In making this 
determination, the CSRO "shall give deference to the decision of the agency." 
Id. (emphasis added). The CSRO's review is limited because "discipline 
·- -
imposed for employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the 
[agency head], which will be reversed only when the punishment is clearly 
disproportionate to the offense, and exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
34 
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and rationality." Sorge v. Office of Attorney Gen., 2006 UT App 2, if 31, 128 
@ P.3d 566 (citing Lunnen, 886 P.2d at 73); Lucas v. Murray City Ciu. Serv. 
Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also Harmon v. Ogden 
City Serv. Comm'n, 2007 UT App 336, ,I 6, 171 P.3d 474 (fire chief is entitled 
to deference because he is best able to balance the competing concerns in 
pursuing a particular disciplinary action); In Re the Discharge of Wayne L. 
Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986) (sheriff must manage and direct his 
deputies and is in the best position to know whether their actions merit 
ltJi discipline); Greer v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm., 2007 UT App 293, *2 
(unpublished) (police chief "must have the ability to manage and direct his 
officers, and is in the best position to know whether their actions merit 
discipline," particularly where chief lost confidence in [employee's] ability to 
conduct himself in serving the public). 
This Court announced several factors to help guide the CSRO and other 
tribunals in assessing proportionality: 
(a) whether the violation is directly related to the employee's 
official duties and significantly impedes his or her ability to carry 
out those duties; (b) whether the offense was of a type that 
adversely affects the public confidence in the department; (c) 
whether the offense undermines the morale and effectiveness of 
the department; or (d) whether the offense was committed 
willfully or knowingly, rather than negligently or inadvertently. 
Court's have further considered whether the misconduct is likely 
to reoccur. 
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Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, ii 18, 116 P.3d 973. This 
Court also noted that the strength of the evidence can be considered, as well 
as an employee's past service record, an employee's dishonesty, and whether 
the misconduct was part of a series of violations accompanied by progressive 
discipline. Id. And the Court noted that its prior case law acknowledging the 
severity of the misconduct as another valid factor to consider. Id. at ,r 17. 
Most of these factors militate in favor of termination. The evidence was 
anything but tenuous; it was undisputed that Burgess got out of the cab and 
into the truck, despite the intervention of airport police. Burgess was 
dishonest when he deceived the airport officers into thinking he would take 
the cab home. Director Cook considered the misconduct to be severe. 
Burgess's misconduct impeded his ability to carry out his duties, inasmuch as 
trust was vital to Burgess's assignment and his misconduct eviscerated the 
Director's trust in him. The offense was of a type that adversely affects public 
confidence in the Department, even if it did not in fact become well known 
enough to have actually affected public confidence; Burgess's nonchalant 
attitude toward possible drunk driving and his utter disregard for and 
defiance of the airport police's intervention is certainly at odds with a top law 
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enforcement priority to prevent drunk driving and protect the community 
(.j from drunk drivers. 
It was logical and reasonable for Director Cook to conclude that 
imposing a lesser sanction would likely be perceived by fellow employees or 
the public as allowing a double standard, thereby undermining eighteen 
months of work to increase public confidence in the department and morale 
within the department. The "slap on the wrist" mentality was one of the very 
things Director Cook was trying fix. A slap on the wrist for such serious 
misconduct would have been a step backward from the new expectation of 
increased employee accountability. 
And Burgess's decisions to get out of the cab and into the truck were 
made knowingly and willfully. Even though he tries to cloud his decision in 
ignorance because he did not at the time know how high Fredrickson's blood 
alcohol level was, there was abundant evidence that Burgess acted knowingly 
and willfully in disregard of the airport police's intervention, as well as in 
disregard of other signs of Fredrickson's impairment, and that he was aware 
of the risks of leaving the cab. In addition, Director Cook was extremely 
concerned that Burgess would exhibit similar poor judgment again in the 
future and while on the job. And Director Cook perceived that Burgess failed 
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to take full responsibility for getting out of the cab and did not appear to fully 
understand the seriousness of what he did. 
But, more to the point of Director Cook's discretion, Burgess has not 
shown that termination was clearly outside the reasonable range of decisions 
his discretion would have allowed him to make. See Tolman, 818 P.2d 23, 26 
(quoting R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 759 (1976)) ("Discretion 
'encompasses the power of choice among several courses of action, each of 
which is considered permissible."'). Even if, as the CSRO suggested, the 
range of possible sanctions might have included both termination and a hefty 
suspension, Director Cook's discretion left him "free to choose from among 
this range without regard to what an appellate court thinks is the 'best' 
answer." Murray, 2013 UT 38, if 30. And considering everything Director 
Cook factored into his decision, from Burgess's audacity in defying airport 
police moments after they left, to how Director Cook was fulfilling the 
governor's mandate, the CSRO logically and reasonably concluded that 
Director Cook had not imposed a disproportionate sanction or otherwise 
abused his discretion. Id. at ,r 32 (reasonableness is "essentially a test for 
-- . -
logic and completeness rather than the correctness of the decision"). 
Contrary to Burgess's assertion, the Harmon decision did not hold that 
a certain set of circumstances will definitively or automatically "tip the 
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balance against termination." Id. To the contrary, this Court merely 
~ suggested a hypothetical circumstance that "may"- but not must - tip the 
balance against termination. Id. This inapposite circumstance is when an 
exemplary service record is coupled with "tenuous evidence of misconduct." 
Id. Harmon in no way intimates that an exemplary service record, on its 
own, must outweigh all other considerations, including the seriousness of the 
misconduct. If such was the case, an employee with an exemplary service 
record could not be terminated for a first instance of misconduct, no matter 
~ how egregious. To the contrary, Harmon sets out an employee's past 
disciplinary record as one of many considerations to be considered, without 
limiting an employing agency's discretion in how much weight to give each 
factor. The Harmon court wisely declined to define any set of circumstances 
that would definitively mandate a sanction less than termination; to do so 
would have encroached on the reviewing agency's discretion by allowing one 
or two factors to outweigh the rest. Here, the CSRO simply gave less weight 
to Burgess's disciplinary history, noting that it might have given that history 
more weight if the facts were significantly different: if airport police had not 
intervened, not suggested and arranged for a taxi, not arrested Burgess for 
individualized suspicion of public intoxication, and not arrested Fredrickson 
for DUI. R. 494-95. 
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Burgess's argument notwithstanding, the evidence of Burgess's 
misconduct was anything but tenuous. Burgess admitted that the police 
intervention at the airport occurred. He admitted that this intervention left 
an impression - he was surprised and intimidated by it. This intervention 
alone should have logically given Burgess pause before blindly accepting 
Fredrickson's assertion of sobriety. In addition, the Department presented 
additional objective evidence that should have given Burgess further pause: 
the initial officer was concerned enough about any of the three men driving; 
Fredrickson's arresting officer said Fredrickson had slurred speech, glossy 
and red eyes, and smelled of alcohol; that officer would not have felt 
comfortable with Fredrickson driving based on those signs alone, even 
without knowing that Fredrickson's blood alcohol was more than twenty 
percent of the legal limit; Burgess himself admitted that he had seen 
Fredrickson drinking all day. 
Yet, despite all of this - and especially despite the intimidating police 
intervention and its impact on Burgess - Burgess chose not to question 
Fredrickson's protestations of sobriety. Just moments after police left, 
Burgess got out of the cab. He then got into Fredrickson's truck. He never 
encouraged Fredrickson to stay in the cab or tried to dissuade him from 
driving. This evidence is not tenuous, even though Burgess dislikes the 
40 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inferences and conclusions drawn from it - both by Director Cook and then, 
~ ultimately by the CSRO. 
When viewed in light of Director Cook's charge to reform the 
Department, the CSRO's decision was not "clearly against the logic and 
effect" of the facts or "against the reasonable and probable deductions to be 
drawn from the facts." Sorge, 2006 UT App 2, ,r 22 (citation omitted). 
Rather, the CSRO's proportionality assessment was closely and logically tied 
to the evidence. Director Cook had been working persistently for eighteen 
vJ months to fulfill his mandate. He had worked from day one to increase 
departmental accountability for misconduct and made it clear that he would 
hold employees to a higher standard of conduct. It was logical and 
reasonable for Director Cook to give considerable weight to these 
considerations. 
It was equally logical for Director Cook to lose confidence in Burgess for 
his insistence that blind trust in a friend was adequate justification for 
disregarding and defying the intervention of multiple officers from a sister 
law enforcement agency. Among the specific problems Director Cook was 
trying to fix in the Department was its poor reputation among sister law 
enforcement and corrections agencies. 
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Burgess's remaining argument about inconsistent discipline lacks 
merit. Director Cook did not consider relevant any discipline imposed by 
prior administrations, nor was he required to by rule. See Utah Admin. R. 
4 77-11-3 ("agency head ... need only consider those cases decided under the 
administration of the current agency head"). There was no evidence of a 
prior discipline during Director Cook's administration that would have 
supported a claim of inconsistent treatment. The CSRO correctly noted that 
the arguably closest comparable discipline - the dog bit incident - was 
irrelevant because it occurred after Burgess's discipline. R. 444. The 
purportedly comparable discipline involving a failure to report child abuse 
was clearly distinguishable because of a lack of proof that the misconduct 
occurred. Tr. 381. The other purported comparable disciplines did not even 
come close to Burgess's situation. When a grievant cannot be compared to 
others similarly situated, this Court examines the discipline "only in the 
context of the misconduct and role and purpose of the Department." Sorge at 
,r 31. The reasonable and logical manner in which Burgess's misconduct was 
CO!]-Sidered in light of the role and purpose of the Department has already 
been discussed at length. 
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For the foregoing reasons, this court should uphold the CSRO decision 
affirming the agency's decision to term~te Burgess's employment. 
Respectfully submitted this / /p "l:;of October, 2015. 
SEAN REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Attorneys for Utah Department of 
Corrections 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW OFFICE 
STEPHEN M. BURGESS, 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, 
Agency. 
RULING ON GRIEV ANT'S 
AMENDED MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 2010 CSRO/H.O. 086 
Hearing Officer Katherine A. Fox 
Grievant filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration on February 2, 2015, asking that the 
original decision in this matter be "reversed" based on three arguments. The first basis is that the 
Agency failed to provide sufficient notice to Grievant that he was being terminated because the 
Executive Director could no longer trust him and therefore, the alleged insufficient notice violated 
his due process rights. The second claim is that the original decision reached an erroneous conclusion 
that there was substantial evidence to conclude Grievant's conduct violated "any Department 
policy ... or failed to advance the good of the public service." The third argument is that terminating 
Grievant for his decision to get into the truck with his friend who intended to drive while drunk is 
disproportionate ( an therefore, an abuse of discretion) to the offense. I will consider each of these 
arguments below. 
I. INSUFFICIENT NOTICE/DUE PROCESS VIOLATION, 
It has been long established that certain public employees such as Grievant have a property 
interest in their jobs and that interest cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate 
procedures. Grievant contends that he was denied due process because the notice he received did not 
specify that the Executive Director no longer trusted him. A consideration of this claim must contain 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a determination as to what constitutionally protected process Gricvant was entitled and only then, 
an examination of whether it was duly afforded. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded in the seminal 
case of Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 4 70 U.S. 532 ( 1985) that in light of balancing 
several important interests, "before an employee's termination, minimum due process entitles an 
employee to oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an 
opportunity for the employee to present his or her side of the story in 'something less than a full 
evidentiary hearing"' (citations omitted). 
As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "Due process is not a technical conception with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and requires such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands. In an analysis of a procedure, an important factor is 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the procedures, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep 't., 
616 P.2d 598 at 602 (Utah 1980). 
The CSRO and indeed, this hearing officer, has had a number of opportunities to address the 
sufficiency of a termination notice as it relates to due process although not in this exact context. See, 
e.g., M Dale King v. Utah Department of Human Services, 7 CSRB 70 Step 6 Decision (2003) at 
29-33. Perhaps the closest example is Margo Halliday v UDHR, 17 CSRB/HO244 (1999). There, 
the Grievant argued that the Notice of Intent letter she received did not specify the exact case logs 
ofwhich she was alleged to have falsified, only that she had generally falsified numerous entries. 
She claimed, therefore, that the Department violated her due process rights by failing to give her 
proper notice of the charges against her at her preliminary administrative hearing. Specifically, she 
Stephen Burgess v. Utah Department of Corrections, 2010 CS RO/HO 086 
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argued the Department failed to inform her at that particular stage of the proceedings of the specific 
case logs she allegedly falsified. 
The hearing office in the Halliday case wrote in his decision: 
I conclude that Gricvant's due process rights were not violated. This 
conclusion is reached for the following reasons: (a) While not 
specifying the exact case logs that were allegedly falsified, the 
"Notice of Intent to Terminate" letter given to Grievant by the 
Department clearly informed her that falsification of case logs was 
one of the grounds for her dismissal; (b) While copies of the exact 
case logs allegedly falsified were not given to Grievant at the Step 4 
Hearing, the Department discussed the issue generally with her at the 
hearing and gave her an opportunity to present her side of the story; 
(c) The Step 4 Hearing was conducted in such a way as to comply 
with the minimal requirements of due process set forth in Utah Code 
Ann.§ 67-19-18(5)(a)aswell asloudermillv. Cleveland Ed. a/Educ. 
470 U.S. 532 (1985); and (d) At the prehearing conference conducted 
by the CSRB Administrator, the Department gave Grievant copies of 
the case logs it intended to rely on at the Step 5 Hearing. At one point 
in the hearing Halliday's counsel conceded that while his client may 
have received due process, it was "minimal due process" at best. 
In his Amended Motion for Reconsideration, Grievant apparently fails to apprehend that a 
lack of trust is not in and of itself a basis to terminate an employee, but an effect of the misconduct 
that violates a rule, policy, law or regulation. The Executive Director's lack of trust in Grievant was 
a consequence of Grievant's actions when he decided to get out of the taxi called by airport police 
and get into his friend's truck. The Executive Director's reaction to Grievant's poor judgment may 
just as well have been one of frustration, impatience or even disgust. The bottom line is that 
Grievant's choices under the circumstances, which violated policy, undermined the Executive 
Director's confidence in him. That, in turn, made the Executive Director question Grievant's 
judgment and his ability to perform a job which sometimes requires split second decisions in difficult 
Stephen Burgess v. Utah Department of Corrections, 20 IO CSRO/HO 086 
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circumstances with a suspect population and great potential harm to the public. The Agency is not 
required to enumerate a parade of horribles and every conceivable effect of an action in a termination 
notice to justify its decision. In order to receive sufficient due process in this type of administrative 
proceeding, Grievant was entitled to know what specific conduct was deemed problematic and what 
rule, policy, regulation or law was allegedly violated. In reviewing the Intent to Dismiss, this he had. 
II. No SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONCLUSION THAT GRIEVANT VIOLATED 
ANY RULE, POLICY, LAW OR REGULATION. 
The Decision that I issued in this case clearly finds that allegations of public intoxication 
were not supported by substantial evidence. Grievant may or may not have been intoxicated and it 
was impossible to tell from the evidence presented. Thus, that basis has been vacated. There arc, 
however, other policies that were cited in the Intent to Dismiss letter. One of those was UDC Policy 
AE. 02/07. That policy requires that member of the Department conduct themselves lawfully and 
honestly. Honesty is not necessarily limited to whether someone is telling the truth. For instance, 
one may be dishonest by failure to disclose something or by a misleading response. Grievant was 
not honest in his actions when he indicated he would take a taxi, got in the taxi, but then got out of 
the taxi. Honesty encompasses such things as exhibiting integrity in a professional context and 
ensuing trustworthiness. While Grievant may not have violated a law in this incident, he clearly was 
dishonest even though he was not charged with lying. Grievant would be hard pressed to argue that 
the taxi incident exhibited his sense of honesty and reflected his trustworthiness. Honesty also means 
-
to avoid deception. Grievant deceived the airport police officers by allowing them to believe he 
would do something and then not doing it. 
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The other policy cited in the Intent to Dismiss letter was UDC Policy AE 02/11.03 section 
P governing professionalism. In part, that section states that no member shall act or behave privately 
or officially in such a manner that undennines the efficiency of the Department, or brings discredit 
upon himself, the State or Utah or the Department. Certainly, this incident had the potential to bring 
discredit upon the Department in the public arena, and moreover, it did bring discredit upon Grievant 
and within the Department. 
Ill. THE PENAL TY OF TERMINATION WAS DISPROPORTIONATE TO GRIEVANT'S OFFENSE. 
Finally, Grievant argues that his termination constituted an abuse of discretion because it was 
disproportionate to his offense. This argument relies heavily on the analytical prong that Grievant 
had a blemish-free work history. However, an employee's work record is just one among many 
factors that an Agency head may consider when assessing discipline. Moreover, it is not a 
controlling factor. Grievant also claims that Grievant's offense was not that serious, especially when 
compared to other employee misconduct which warranted termination other cases. This claim, even 
if true, however, is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that an abuse of discretion occurred. 
An analogy might be that even though an employee did not assault her supervisor, she still can be 
terminated for committing petty theft. Grievant then argues that he had defensible reasons for his 
actions, e.g., he did not believe that his long-time friend was legally intoxicated and should not be 
driving. Thus, the argument continues, there is no substantial evidence to support his termination. 
This might be a stronger argument if the airport police had not been involved and: (I) told 
the men to take a taxi -which they then arranged for; (2) they had not arrested Grievant for suspicion 
of public intoxication; and (3) had Frederickson, the driver, not been arrested and later convicted 
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of DUI. It is the very beliefs that Grievant held and acted upon - that everything was A-OK- that 
led him to do what he did. Even Grievant admitted in his appeal letter to the Executive Director that, 
"I know my actions that night were ultimately the wrong ones - I made a very big mistake by getting 
out of the cab with the other two passengers." Although Grievant did not intend to engage in 
misconduct he is still accountable for what he did. 
The standard of abuse of discretion is a high one and extremely difficult to meet. The facts 
of this case and applicable law as outlined in the original decision reflect why this standard has not 
been met. Although I would not have made the decision that the Executive Director made in this 
case, and instead imposed a hefty suspension, a hearing officer cannot substitute his or her judgment 
after an Agency has acted if the applicable criteria are met. 
DATED this 12111 day of February, 2015. 
~{2-~ 
KA THERINE A. F X 
CSRO Presiding Hearing Officer 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to Utah Adm in. 
Code R 13 7-1-21 (J 3)(14), and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-40/ and 403, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
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